This letter is about a principal weakness of the published article by Li et al. in 2014 . It seems that the mentioned work has a terrible conceptual mistake while presenting its theoretical approach. In fact, the work has tried to design a new attack and its effective solution for a basic watermarking algorithm by Zhu et al. 
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Zhu et al. have presented their new watermarking algorithm for copyright protection of remote sensing images [1] which have specific features in terms of intensity, edge, texture and so on [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] (e.g. the case in Figure 1 ). Figure 1 . A sample for remote sensing images [4, 8] In 2014, Li et al. [2] have introduced a modification for Zhu et al.'s scheme. In fact, Li et al. firstly tried to find a security hole in Zhu et al.'s scheme and then proposed a certain attack for this scheme. And finally, they solved the problem regarding to this attack by introducing a solution based on a chaotic hash function. In this letter, Li et al.'s work was strongly disproved because we believe discovering the security hole in their work has a problem and in the other words, there is no hole in the Zhu et al.'s scheme. Thus, all modifications done for improving the basic algorithm are principally unnecessary.
THEORETICAL EVALUATION
According to third part in [2] , in the original scheme [1, 3] although all of the pixels in the host image I are summed, the final achieved check bit b is just a bit. To make b equal to binary watermark W which is a bit of the encrypted watermark to be embedded, at most one pixel in the image will be reserved, as stated in fifth step of watermark embedding process of the original image [2] . It means that the embedded binary watermark W can be changed by varying just one pixel of the watermarked image I  which opens a security hole. Details of the designed attack for this aim are as below [2] Step3: If b is equal to  b , do nothing; else, reverse (do complementation) each pixel in I .
According to [2] and after performing the above steps, the watermark W embedded in original watermarked image is replaced with  W of the attacker's image. In [2] and after these steps, the authors have done some proofs and presented solutions for the attack problem, however, they have accepted steps 1 to 3 as a lemma without any proof and exactly this case creates a weakness, because accuracy of these steps is not considered. We are going to disprove it by a solved numerical example. If these steps become disproved, then all concluded items based on these approaches will be disproved.
Assume that we have a 2 2  host image with depth 2-bit as follow:
And the attacker's image is the same of original host image, this issue is not forbidden according to [2] , but we can select I  different from I .
Also, assume original binary watermark W and the attacker's binary watermark  W are as follow:
According to step (3) of attack process, an enough way for attack is   b b . We now see with using two images I and I  as Eq. (1) . Therefore, we complete embedding process and then extraction process and finally will see in this example that W will not be replaced with  W , against step (3). If I  and  I  are watermarked images based on {I, W} and  {I, W}  , respectively, then they are computable using embedding process of the original scheme [1] , as below:
As a result, with using I  ,  I  and check bits 
